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Abstract. The present paper examines the relative influence of religion and nation on conceptions of virtues. In a first study, conducted
in the Netherlands, 926 respondents of different profession, age, sex, and religious background rank ordered a list of 15 virtues. A
comparison of Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims showed a remarkably high resemblance in their ratings of virtues. Only faith was rated
as being much more important by Muslims than by non-Muslims. In the second study, the influence of national cultures was examined.
Adults (N = 795) from two culturally relatively similar countries, Germany and the Netherlands, and from Spain rated the same list of
virtues. Crossnational differences between the two Northern European countries and Spain by far exceeded the influence of religion on
the importance ratings of virtues. The implications of the findings for the often-mentioned clash of religions are discussed. Currently, the
influence of religion on the values of immigrants may be overemphasized and other important characteristics may be underestimated.
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Introduction
Do national cultures influence moral ideas or do different
religious groups that take part in the society shape moral
ideas? This study examines the relative influence of reli-
gion versus national culture on moral ideas. This theme is
investigated through an analysis of virtues, which may be-
come a special and useful approach to register divergence
or convergence of moral principles within societies as vir-
tue refers to a moral concept that everybody can easily un-
derstand. The Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, Aris-
totle, and their Christian disciples Augustine and Aquinas
examined virtues because they regarded them to be the
character traits that make someone a “good person.” We
define virtues as “morally good personal characteristics”
that everyone can either possess or learn. They can be con-
sidered to form a subset of traits. They dictate how the in-
dividual ought to behave or ought to be. Values such as
humor, intelligence, or beauty may be desirable but not
necessarily something one ought to bring into practice.
Therefore, not all values are virtues. This distinguishes vir-
tues from values, although virtues can also be seen as a
subset of values. It is hard to imagine a virtue that cannot
be considered a value. Many virtues, for instance, helpful-
ness and justice, refer to concrete social interactions be-
tween individuals, which is why virtues can become guid-
ing principles when people try to enhance social cohesion
or integration of immigrant groups.
There has been a long-standing interest among psychol-
ogists in concepts related to morality. Clear examples are
Piaget’s (1997) and Kohlberg’s (1984) work on the devel-
opment of moral judgment in children. Additionally, vari-
ous virtues have become the focus of research attention,
often referred to as strengths (Schimmel, 2000). Bandura
(1973), for instance, explored the determinants of altruism,
empathy, and helping behavior, and Rokeach (1973) pub-
lished extensively on the nature of values. Perhaps most
directly, Erikson (1959, 1982) examined a variety of virtues
or basic strengths, such as hope, will, purpose, competence,
fidelity, love, care, and wisdom, and how these relate to
stages of development.
Over time, the concept of morality has become more
important, if not fashionable, in psychology. In modern
evolutionary psychology, altruistic behavior is seen as cru-
cial for group cohesion and consequently for the survival
of the species (e.g., De Waal, 2006). For instance, De Waal
(2006) argued in his book, Primates and Philosophers:
How Morality Evolved, that human morality grows from
our genes, and that the traits that define morality – empathy,
reciprocity, reconciliation, and consolation – can be ob-
served in many animals, most particularly in primates. Ac-
cording to De Waal, empathy is an automatic response seen
in dogs, apes, and human infants. It is an immediate re-
sponse, arising too quickly to be under voluntary control.
The concept of virtue has also returned to the domain of
personality psychology. In a factor-analytical study of per-
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sonality characteristics, De Raad and Barelds (2008) re-
ported a first factor they labeled “virtue.” Baumeister
(2005, p. 308), in his book The Cultural Animal, explained
that the human being is also a moral animal: “Undoubtedly
some of culture’s strongest means to influence behavior are
contained in morality.” The positive psychology movement
also refocused psychology on human strengths and virtues
over the last decade. A key publication was Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi’s special issue of American Psychologist
(2000) on positive psychology. Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and
Seligman (2005) examined religious and philosophical tra-
ditions around the world and found a group of six core
virtues. They argued that a classification of positive traits
is essential for research and practice.
There is an additional reason for the renewed interest in
moral principles: Globalization and immigration have
brought many different cultures into contact. In Western
Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States and Can-
ada, a great number of immigrants originate from Muslim
countries. Muslims are still a minority group in the Euro-
pean Union, making up roughly 5% of its total population,
but Islam is a fast-growing religion in Europe. Many Mus-
lim immigrants bring a vital religion with them, together
with a set of moral values that are often perceived to be
incompatible with Western values (see, e.g., Zick, Küpper,
& Hövermann, 2011). Events such as 9/11, the terrorist at-
tacks in Madrid and London, and the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq seem to have reinforced fears about a possible
clash between postmodern Christian values and Islamic
values in Western immigration countries. Majority groups
in Western immigration countries tend to believe that Mus-
lims want to remain distinct from society in their countries,
rather than adopting the culture of the majority (The Pew
Global Attitudes Project, 2005; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, &
Buunk, 1998). The Pew survey further showed that, in
countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the
United States and Canada, Muslims have a growing sense
of Islamic identity. In Western Europe, particularly in Ger-
many and The Netherlands, Muslims are perceived nega-
tively (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005). A new
study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006, p. 1)
again revealed that “after a year marked by riots over car-
toon portrayals of Muhammad, a major terrorist attack in
London, and continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most
Muslims and Westerners are convinced that relations be-
tween them are generally bad these days.”
These developments bring us to the question of whether
we must expect fundamental values to diverge in societies
that are increasingly becoming religiously heterogeneous.
Will different religious values diverge within immigration
countries – or will they gradually and eventually converge?
There are two possible outcomes according to Inglehart and
Baker (2000):
1) New religious groups and their institutions instill their
distinctively moral values in their followers, thus en-
hancing the disparity of moral values within the host
society.
2) Religious traditions that have historically shaped a na-
tional culture continue to have an impact, through na-
tional institutions, on the society as a whole, including
newcomers.
Inglehart and Baker found evidence for the impact of
national institutions on the convergence of religious val-
ues within nations. They mention as examples German
and Dutch Catholics who were shaped by the dominant
Protestant institutions in the respective countries. In a
similar vein, a “European Islam” may develop, shaped
by religious institutions in Europe. A somewhat differ-
ent, but related point of view is expressed by Huntington
in his book The Clash of Civilizations (1996), who stated
that the great division among humankind would be cul-
tural. Nation states would continue to be the most pow-
erful actors, but the most important political conflicts
would occur between different civilizations or religions.
Apparently, he also considered nations – or blocs of na-
tions – the main agents of culture. A survey in Great
Britain and the United States in 2008 showed that, in
spite of the shared Christian heritage in both nations,
there are much stronger discrepancies between British
and American respondents on religious issues than on a
variety of important political issues (“Anglo-Saxon atti-
tudes,” 2008). On the other hand, research by Cohen and
Hill (2007) suggested that religious group differences
can be conceptualized as cultural differences that shape
personal and social aspects of religious and spiritual mo-
tivation, moral judgment, and other processes. They do
not, however, exclude the theoretical perspective that
country differences produce religion differences.
It would require a lengthy longitudinal study to exam-
ine the gradual processes of convergence or divergence of
moral values between various religious groups within im-
migration nations. However, in order to be able to draw
some conclusions at present, we performed two studies.
In the first study, we focused on the relative importance
of virtues across different religious groups in The Nether-
lands, a country in which different religions have coexist-
ed for a long time. In all major religions, virtues are ex-
plicitly mentioned. In Christianity, Aquino (1225–1274)
postulated three theological virtues: hope, love, and faith.
In the Koran there is a list of over 25 virtues – not all of
them can be crucial, although faith and charity, being two
of the five pillars of Islam, are definitely core values. In
the second study, we compared the importance ratings of
virtues in a Dutch sample with those in a German sample.
Germany and The Netherlands were chosen because they
were mentioned by Inglehart and Baker (2000) as nations
that have had a similar experience of coexistence of dif-
ferent religious groups. Another reason to choose Germa-
ny is that it is culturally most related to The Netherlands.
Germany has comparable scores on three of Hofstede’s
(1991) dimensions (individualism/collectivism, power
distance, and uncertainty avoidance); it only scores con-
siderably higher than The Netherlands on masculinity.
30 J. P. van Oudenhoven et al.: Are Virtues Shaped by National Cultures or Religions?
Swiss J. Psychol. 71 (1) © 2012 Verlag Hans Huber, Hogrefe AG, Bern
These two samples were compared with a sample from the
culturally more distant (more collectivistic) Spain that has
been predominantly Roman Catholic for centuries. Spain
has a slightly higher power distance and uncertainty
avoidance than the other two nations and is much lower
on masculinity than Germany. In a previous study Van Ou-
denhoven, De Raad et al. (2008) compared the frequency
of abuse terms in 11 countries (including Spain, Germany,
and The Netherlands). Terms of abuse can also be seen as
indicators of (violation of) moral values. Differences in
terms of abuse were found to reflect differences in moral
expressiveness between cultures in accordance with as-
sumed discrepancies in individualism versus collectivism:
In Spain, terms referring to lack of politeness or offending
relatives were much more frequent than in Germany or
The Netherlands. All three nations have growing numbers




Respondents were 83 teachers, 221 local politicians, 200
adults largely approached via a snowball method, and
422 secondary school students. The four groups of re-
spondents came from different areas in The Netherlands;
their average age was 31.47 years (SD = 16.74); half of
the respondents were female; 19% of the group consisted
of Catholics, 18% of Protestants, 15% of Muslims, 11%
belonged to a heterogeneous group with different philos-
ophies of life, and 35% considered themselves nonreli-
gious.
Instrument
Respondents filled out a questionnaire in Dutch. First,
they answered a series of demographic questions on their
sex, country of birth, age, education, maternal language,
and religion. Next, they were asked to mention “impor-
tant personal characteristics that they would like to put
in practice in daily life.” Finally, to answer the crucial
question of this study, they were to distribute a set 15
virtues among five columns, three in each column ac-
cording to the importance attributed to them. This way, a
5-point scale was formed from 1 (= least important) to 5
(= most important). The list of 15 virtues (respect, justice,
wisdom, joy, resolution, mercy, reliability, hope, courage,
faith, moderation, openness, modesty, love, and helpful-
ness) was based on a survey among spiritual leaders
asked to come up with important virtues (Van Oudenho-
ven, Blank, Leemhuis, Pomp, & Sluis, 2008). The 64 vir-
tues they mentioned were reduced to a much smaller
number by a group of five independent judges who cat-
egorized them on the basis of resemblance. They individ-
ually made groups of virtues they thought were highly
related. These five groups of virtues showed a large
amount of overlap. Finally, on the basis of these catego-
ries, the researchers formed a set of 15 virtues labeled as
mentioned above.
Results and Discussion
There were only minor differences in importance scores
between the teachers, politicians, adults, and students. Gen-
der differences in particular were negligible: Males and fe-
males appear to mutually replicate their scores. Generally,
the results in Figure 1 do not show large differences be-
tween Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and nonreligious re-
spondents. The major exception is the virtue faith, which
is clearly more important for Muslims than for the other
three groups. However, this should probably – at least part-
ly – be attributed to the sampling in that most Muslim re-
spondents were approached at Islamic schools and not at
public schools, where teaching of religion is minimal and
more general. The rank-order correlation (Spearman’s ρ)
of importance of virtues between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims is .74 (and .92 if we leave the virtue faith out of the
analysis). These correlations suggest that, in general, there
is considerable agreement between Dutch Muslims and
non-Islamic Dutch about which virtues are important and
which are not. Furthermore, the average difference be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims on a scale of 1–5 was
only .25 (and only .19 on the list of virtues without faith).
Interestingly, Dutch Muslims show the highest correlation
(r = .86) in importance ratings with Dutch Protestants, and
the lowest (r = .68) with Dutch Catholics.
Figure 1. The importance of virtues (1 = least important, 5
= most important) rated by different (non)religious groups
in The Netherlands (n = 926).
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Respondents were from Germany (n = 218), Spain (n =
204), and The Netherlands (n = 373). The average age of
German participants was 29.89 years (SD = 11.04); 45% of
them were male. The average age of the Spaniards was
26.94 years (SD = 10.49); 52% of them were male. The
average age of the Dutch was 24.83 years (SD = 6.63); 28%
of them were male. Respondents in the three countries were
approached at several faculties by the researchers and in
the personal networks of the researchers. Additional re-
spondents were approached via the snowball sampling
technique. Most of the participants were nonreligious. All
respondents were highly educated (college level or higher);
approximately 70% of them were students.
Instrument
Respondents filled out a questionnaire almost identical to
that used in Study 1. The questionnaires were in German,
Spanish, and Dutch; they had been translated from Dutch
and backtranslated by a team of bilingual (Dutch-Spanish
and Dutch-German) researchers.
Results and Discussion
Again, there were only negligible gender differences in im-
portance ratings of virtues. An analysis of variance of impor-
tance of virtue ratings with nation as a between-subjects fac-
tor yielded significant differences on all virtues. A Bonferroni
posthoc analysis was conducted to determine which nations
differ in importance ratings. The results showed that most of
the significant differences found were between the Germans
and Spaniards (see Table 1). The largest overall difference
(.51) was found between the Germans and Spaniards (see also
Figure 2). A slightly smaller overall difference of .41 was
found between the Dutch and Spaniards. The rank order cor-
Figure 2. Importance of virtues ratings by Dutch, German,
and Spanish participants (1 = least important; 5 = most
important).
Table 1
Mean importance scores (1 = least important; 5 = most important), standard deviations for all 15 virtues in three nations,
and Bonferroni posthoc analyses
Virtue Dutch German Spanish Dutch vs. German Dutch vs. Spanish German vs. Spanish Largest difference
found between:
p-value p-value p-value
Respect 4.16 (1.05) 4.14 (1.12) 4.73 (0.81) 1.00 .0001 .0001 Spanish-German
Justice 3.92 (1.07) 3.88 (1.06) 4.27 (1.01) 1.00 .0001 .0001 Spanish-German
Wisdom 3.16 (1.25) 3.13 (1.22) 3.40 (1.07) 1.00 .067 .071 Spanish-German
Joy 3.62 (1.22) 3.92 (1.03) 3.83 (1.10) .006 .100 1.00 Dutch-German
Resolution 2.43 (1.23) 2.79 (1.22) 2.32 (1.24) .001 .0001 .0001 Spanish-German
Mercy 2.32 (1.06) 1.61 (0.85) 2.35 (1.20) .0001 1.00 .0001 Spanish-German
Reliability 4.10 (0.93) 3.67 (1.14) 2.47 (1.16) .0001 .0001 .0001 Dutch-Spanish
Hope 2.29 (1.13) 2.56 (1.23) 2.70 (1.25) .026 .0001 .655 Dutch-Spanish
Courage 2.28 (1.13) 2.43 (1.17) 2.60 (1.16) .449 .007 .398 Dutch-Spanish
Faith 2.05 (1.49) 1.65 (1.06) 2.15 (1.33) .001 1.00 .001 Spanish-German
Moderation 2.30 (1.15) 2.17 (1.20) 2.51 (1.16) .530 .134 .009 Spanish-German
Openness 3.11 (1.28) 3.78 (1.06) 2.17 (1.20) .0001 .0001 .0001 Spanish-German
Modesty 2.36 (1.23) 2.41 (1.16) 2.80 (1.21) 1.00 .0001 .002 Dutch-Spanish
Love 4.12 (1.13) 3.88 (1.17) 4.16 (1.14) .045 1.00 .035 Spanish-German
Helpfulness 3.77 (1.13) 3.63 (1.13) 3.28 (1.07) .451 .0001 .004 Dutch-Spanish
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relation (Spearman’s ρ) of the sets of virtue importance rat-
ings between the Germans and the Dutch was .85. The aver-
age mean score difference in importance ratings between the
Dutch and Germans was .27; Germans and Dutch indeed
show considerable resemblance with respect to virtues. The
largest mean difference (.71) between the two nations con-
cerned mercy. The Germans scored lower than the Dutch on
mercy, which may be expected on the basis of Germany’s
high masculinity scores (Hofstede, 1991). The average dif-
ferences in virtue ratings between Germany and The Nether-
lands, on the one hand, and Germany and Spain, on the other
hand (.51 and .41, respectively) appear to be much larger than
the .25 between Muslims and non-Muslims in Study 1 (see
Figure 1 and Figure 2). We did not find significant differences
in wisdom, one of the cardinal virtues, and only found very
small differences with respect to love, one of the theological
virtues. Wisdom and love are both classical virtues. The
strongest differences in importance ratings of virtues were
found with respect to reliability and openness. They seem to
be culture-dependent.
General Discussion
Do national cultures or religions shape moral ideas? The
title of this paper presents the reader with that choice. In
view of the growing importance of religion in the public
discourse on values, we suspect that most people would
probably bet on religion. However, according to our data,
the correct answer is national culture.
Differences in the importance ratings of virtues between
Spaniards, on the one hand, and Germans or Dutch, on the
other hand, are much larger than between Muslims and
non-Muslims in The Netherlands. Moreover, our results
show that Muslims in The Netherlands resemble Dutch
non-Muslims at least as much as the Dutch resemble the
Germans. This finding becomes even more convincing if
we do not take the virtue of faith into account. Faith is an
ambivalent term. According to the Oxford dictionary, it can
mean both “reliance or trust in,” which can be seen as a
virtue; or as a “religious doctrine,” which can also be seen
as a duty. In view of the strong sanctions against apostasy
from Islam, in particular the banishment from the religious
community, it is not surprising that Muslims found it diffi-
cult to not attach importance to their faith, that is, their
religious doctrine.
The conclusion that conceptions of virtues differ more
between nations than between religions is in line with the
results from studies by Inglehart and Baker (2000) that
stress the importance of cross-national differences in val-
ues. They mention as examples German and Dutch Catho-
lics who were shaped by the dominant Protestant institu-
tions in the respective countries. An interesting finding of
the present study with respect to that conclusion is that
Dutch Muslims resemble Protestants more than they re-
semble Dutch Catholics in their importance ratings of vir-
tues. Most Muslims live in areas in The Netherlands that
have been exposed more to Protestant than to Catholic in-
fluences. There seems to be a larger gap in the perceived
moral beliefs than in the actual beliefs of Muslims and non-
Muslims in The Netherlands. The findings do not support
Samuel Huntington’s theory (1996) about the “clash of civ-
ilizations,” in which he postulates a fundamental gap be-
tween the Western and the Islamic culture.
The relative lack of importance of the influence of reli-
gion compared to that of national cultures on the impor-
tance of virtues has implications for immigration countries.
Particularly in the case of immigrants from the Middle
East, it is too often assumed that they are all Muslims, and
that their religion is one of their most important character-
istics.
One should realize that immigrants bring many different
elements of their national culture into their host society,
encompassing more aspects than religion and moral values.
They bring, among other things, a different language, usu-
ally lower socioeconomic status and educational levels,
frequently a more rural background, deviant legal norms,
discrepant opinions on gender roles, larger families and
more traditional values, as well as an experience of religion
as a way of living that is more strongly interwoven with
the institutions of the state. All these factors may have a
stronger impact than their religion on their concept of vir-
tues or even on their general adjustment to the new society.
We focused only on virtues and the extent to which our
results would generalize to other moral ideas is unclear.
The data suggest that it is not so much the content of moral
values, but rather the intensity of the religion, as reflected
in the high score on faith, which distinguishes Muslims
from other religious or nonreligious groups. The results
support the conclusions drawn on the basis of Hofstede’s
(1991) classification of national cultures. First, The Neth-
erlands and Germany are almost each other’s opposite on
the masculinity-femininity dimension. The largest mean
difference between the Dutch and German samples con-
cerns mercy, which is seen as the least important virtue by
the Germans. A similar difference in mercy was found be-
tween Spain and Germany, which also has a less masculine
culture than Germany. Next, according to Hofstede, Ger-
many and The Netherlands are individualistic countries,
whereas Spain is more collectivistic. One of the differences
between individualism and collectivism is a more explicit
communication. This difference forms an essential part of
Edward Hall’s (1959) distinction between high- and low-
context cultures. In high-context cultures, there are many
contextual elements that help people understand the rules.
As a result, much is taken for granted. By contrast, in low-
context cultures, very little is taken for granted. Not sur-
prisingly, compared to the Spaniards, the Germans and the
Dutch attribute a much higher importance to the virtues of
openness and reliability because they stress clarity and ex-
pliciticy. It is interesting to note that Dutch Muslims attach
roughly the same importance to reliability and openness as
non-Muslim Dutch.
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Reliability, openness, and mercy seem to be culture-de-
pendent virtues. In contrast, the cardinal virtues of wisdom
and justice, and the theological virtue of love, which are
perceived as important in all three nations, seem to be more
universal virtues. The same applies to the more contempo-
rary virtues of respect and joy. It would be important and
interesting to test these speculations in a larger sample of
nations.
To conclude, national cultures appear to have a more
important impact on moral values than do religions. Lay-
men and researchers alike may have overemphasized the
influence of religion and underestimated the impact of oth-
er characteristics of immigrants. One of the implications of
this study is that national culture is a valuable concept for
explaining the differences in virtues between nations. Ap-
parently, as Inglehart and Baker (2000) suggested, national
traditions, reinforced by national institutions, shape the val-
ues of a nation’s members, regardless of diverging religious
heritages and practices. For practitioners, it would be useful
to determine the level at which the shaping of national vir-
tues takes place. Our guess is that the classroom, the work-
place, the neighborhood, the health center, and the local
authorities are key places where teachers, leaders, neigh-
bors, health employees, and police officers consciously or
unconsciously reinforce the virtues that are helpful for
smooth ways of living and working together.
Virtues, by definition, have a strongly evaluative char-
acter. Nevertheless, they seem to be relatively independent
of groups within a society. Measuring the importance peo-
ple attach to certain virtues may be a way of determining
the level of integration or assimilation of individuals and
of determining key virtues on which people from different
backgrounds may agree and, consequently, on the basis of
which they may make concrete rules for behavior.
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